Abstract-We argue that among denial-of-service (DOS) attacks, link-layer jamming is a more attractive option to attackers than radio jamming is. By exploiting the semantics of the link-layer protocol (aka MAC protocol), an attacker can achieve hetter efficiency than blindly jamming the radio signals alone. In this paper, we investigate some jamming attacks on S-MAC, the level of effectiveness and efficiency the attacks can potentially achieve, and a countermeasure that can be impiemented against one of these attacks.
I . INTRODUCTION
Radio jamming is potentially the most direct, nondestructive and yet disruptive form of DOS attack on sensor networks. There are two reasons why an attacker might favor radio jamming over other DOS attacks: (1) it is trivial to execute -the jammer only needs to emit an arbitrary constant signal at a power roughly equal to the signal power of its victims [I], (2) sensor nodes are typically limited to single-frequency use [2] , depriving them of the possibility to use standard countermeasures such as direct sequence spread spectrum and frequency hopping spread spectrum, or some combination of these two techniques [3] . On the other hand, blind radio jamming is not nearly as energy-efficient as link-layer jamming. Let us elaborate in the paragraph below.
Suppose there is a sensor network that has no fixed base stations as points of control (e.g. in a high-security application). A radio jammer, having no base stations to focus its jamming signals on, would have to target the sensor nodes themselves. Assume that every sensor node has a signal power of P,. To jam an area of radius T using an omni-directional antenna, each jamming device needs to draw a power that is proportional to rpP, (3.5 5 p 5 5 for outdoor environments) [ 3 ] . That is, the wider the area, the exponentially more power a jamming device needs. If the energy to these devices cannot be replenished, with high probability, the devices would exhaust themselves much faster than the sensor nodes would. A solution for the attacker is to redwe the jamming power and increase the number of jamming devices, to such an extent that the attacker would reduce to using a network of jamming motes, that is, a network of nodes having comparable capability with the sensor nodes. Taking this a step further, instead of blind radio jamming, the attacker can save energy with link-layer jamming, by taking advantage of the MAC protocol. Note that we are proposing a general attack strategy where 1 ) there are no fixed sinks (nodes that request for, and hence sink information) to attack, e.g. in directed diffusion 141 where ID-less interests propagate through the network, there is no way for a node to tell where the real sinks are; 2) it is infeasible for the attacker to deploy its nodes strategically, except perhaps to air-drop them on top of the target network; 3) the attacker can only estimate where and not how the target network is or would be deployedknowing the location allows the attacker to plan an ambush though. We will show in this paper how an attacker may take adwantage of the MAC protocol, using S-MAC [5] , one of the earliest protocols specifically designed for sensor networks, as our example. The contributions of this paper are (1) to show 3 easy-to-implement attacks on S-MAC, and (2) to show an equally easy-to-implement countermeasure against one of these attacks, thereby (3) delivering the message that MAC protocols should be designed with prevention against DOS attacks in mind.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I1 summarizes the S-MAC protocol. The attacks are described in Section 111, followed by a coun$ermeasure in Section IV. Related work is discussed in Section V before the conclusion is given in Section VI. 
THE S-MAC

ATTACKS O N S-MAC
In this section we discuss our assumptions of the sensor network and the attacker (as a network of jamming motes), details of our attacks and countermeasure, coupled with simulation results.
A . Assumptions
We assume an attacker has 2 goals: the primary goal is to disrupt the network by preventing messages from arriving at the sink node, and the secondary goal is to increase the energy wastage of the sensors. While a sink node is a node that requests information from other sensor nodes, the nodes that supply the requested infomation are called source nodes 141.
We assume the sensor nodes exchange messages that are not encrypted although they might or might not be cryptographically signed. We make this assumption because: (1) encrypted messages introduce an additional cost of at least 200 cycles or 400 nJ per byte using the fastest symmetric algorithm on an ultra-low-power processor [7]; (2) we know of no key management scheme that protects the link layer with more than one encryption key, and consequently the compromise of a single key compromises the whole network; (3) by listening on the channel for some time an attacker can still learn about the S-MAC parameters and attack accordingly. The third point deserves elaboration: if we assume data packets to be typically larger than SYNCIRTSICTSIACK packets (which are roughly of the same length), an attacker might be able to build a prediction model of when data packets are transmitted, by just collecting statistics of the times when longer packets are transmitted. In fact, we are working on such a prediction model.
However we do not assume the attackers know the values of the S-MAC system parameters (e.g. the period, the duty cycle etc.) used by the sensor nodes. Our attacks include a method of estimating these parameters just by listening. The normal nodes use S-MAC with adaptive (istening [6] and a duty cycle of 10% at the link layer, and TinyDiffusion [9] at the network layer, both faithfulIy ported from TinyOS (tinyos.sf . n e t ) . For a total of Tsim virtual seconds, the sink node broadcasts an interest every 10 seconds, while the source nodes each broadcast a matching data every 2 seconds, as an approximation of a network with moderately fast-changing data. T,i, is set to 600 and 1200, where the longer time is for seeing the effect of longer simulation time on the results.
B. Simulation and evuluution model
For simulating mobility, the improved random waypoint One of the things that are not simulated is the interference resulted From jamming, which would in practice cause more data packet loss than in simulation. However this is one of the many simplifications that are conventionally applied in simulations, as is the case that simulated radio ranges are circular/spherical by convention -a departure from actual measurements 1131.
We evaluate how rfective an attack is by measuring primarily the censorship rate R, and secondarily the attrition rare R , . R, measures the percentage of messages blocked. Let AT be the number of messages arriving at the sink in the absence of attacks, and M' be the number of messages arriving at the sink in the presence of attacks, then
R, measures the percentage of additional energy the sensor network has to spend in the presence of attacks.
Let E be the amount of energy spent when there is no attack, and E' be the amount of energy spent when there is attack, then 
C. Details of attacks
Since S-MAC uses a periodic listen-sleep schedule, the simplest attack is to jam the entire listen interval. if the duty cycle is 50%, such an attack ideally allows the attacker to use 50% less energy compared with using radio jamming. Ironically, the more energy the network wants to conserve with a lower duty cycle, the more energy-efficient the attacker becomes. A jamming mote can use Equation 5 to 7 to estimate the period T p , the length of a listen interval 77, and the length of a 
where t,o, t , l , tsa are sleep times obtained from SYNC packets, S is a small estimated constant that compensates for the DCF Inter-Frame Space (DlFS) [ 141 and carriersensing time spent by the sender. Once a jamming mote gets an estimation of Tp and TL, it can adopt a periodic jam-sleep schedule, jamming when its neighbors are listening, and sleeping when its neighbors are sleeping. Note that since a jamming mote must watch out for a pair of consecutive SYNC packets sent by the same sender, it will be some time before it can synchronize with the schedule.
On speculation, the attack can be improved by jamming just the SYNC or CTRL interval. Consider first the case of jamming the SYNC interval and sleeping for the rest of a cycle (i.e. the CTRL interval and the sleep interval). The idea of this attack is that if a sensor node faits to receive the SYNC packets of its neighbors, it would not know it has neighbors that it can transmit data packets to. However some SYNC packets do slip through especially before the jamming motes enter their jam-sleep cycle, and when they do, the sensor nodes that receive the SYNC packets know they themselves are connected. Connected sensor nodes continue to use the CTRL interval to send data packets without problems. So jamming the SYNC interval is ineffective, as verified by simulations. Now consider the case of jamming the CTRL interval. Jamming the CTRL interval prevents RTS/CTS handshakes, and thus data transmissions from taking place. Speculating further, instead of jamming the whole CTRL interval, we can listen in the CTRL interval for CTS packets, and jam the ensuing data packets instead. Since listening consumes less energy than transmission, we might be able to use less energy compared with blindly jamming the CTRL interval. Table I shows the censorship rates of the 3 attacks discussed so far: jamming of the listen interval, the CTRL interval, or data packets. Figure 3 shows the attrition rates and effort ratios, with standard deviations mostly below 10%. In our simulation, the network density D ranges from 3 to 7. A network with D = f or 2 is too sparse to be realistic, while we have problem going beyond D = 7, being currently limited by the computational resources required to simulate networks that dense. After all, networks sparser than our simulated ones exist in practice [IS] . We discuss our observation below in several aspects. I ) Network density: As expected, the lower the density of the jamming motes, or the density of the entire network, the lower the censorship rate of the motes is, since there would be more regions outside the influence of the motes. Although there are simulation runs that record 100% censorship rate, this should not in general be expected, due to the unpredictability and the dynamic nature of the simulated topology.
2) Censorship rate; Data packet jamming has on the average the highest censorship rate for the following reason: before a jamming mote is able to synchronize with the S-MAC schedule, .it can already listen for CTS packets and jam the ensuing data packets. In contrast, 1istedCTRL interval jammers only listen for SYNC Jammed target Listen interval 
ID=7
Listen 50 Censorship rate R, (%) packets, allowing data packets to slip through, before starting their jam-sleep cycle. Between listen and CTRL interval jammers, CTRL interval jammers censor more data because they settle into their jam-sleep cycle earlier than listen interval jammers do.
Denote F ( t ) as the fraction of jamming motes that still have not entered their jam-sleep cycle at time t. are using a good estimate of 6, so this is not the reason for the lower censorship rate of 1istenlCTRL jamming in our case. rate of an attacker network whose density is already the same as the sensor network's (e.g. 100 jamming motes vs 100 sensor nodes), due to the saturation of the effect of attacks.
4) Efloort ratio:
It is not surprising that listen interval Fig, 4. F ( t ) , the fraction of jamming motes that are still unsynchronized at time t , plotted against t , where number of runs = 20, number of jamming motes = 100, D = 7.
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There are two reasons:
I ) The energy for retransmissions is typically less than the energy for listening for the entire sleep interval. To see this numerically, let PR, be the power consumed by listening, then the power consumed by transmitting is (2400/960)P~s = 2.5P&. The energy consumed by listening for the entire sleep interval is TsP&. This is typically less than the energy consumed by sending a data packet tp seconds long which is tp x 2.5P&, because Ts >> t, x 2.5.
listen interval, other motes would not have the chance to cycle sooner, but also are more jamming motes able to follow the schedule. As a result, the effort ratio of CTRL interval jamming decreases with network density. For data packet jammers, as the network gets denser, each jamming mote gets more neighbors, and hence more data packets to jam (while CTRL interval jamming motes get the same CTRL interval to jam). This explains the upward trend of the curves for data packet jammers. It is perhaps surprising that the effort ratio of data packet jamming would exceed 'that of CTRL interval jamming starting from D = 5 (for both Tsim = 600s and 1200s) since data packet jamming is a reactive approach. One reason is that data packet jamming motes, as mentioned, already start jamming before entering their jam-sleep cycle. Another reason has to do with adaptive listening'16J. In the original S-MAC protocol [5], after a node B receives a data packet from its neighbor A, it has to wait until the CTRL interval of the next cycle, before shows that when the settling times of the jamming motes are amortized over a longer simulation period, the effort ratios become lower. The amortization effect is most pronounced with listen interval jammers as they have much longer settling times. The important point is that the increasingldecreasing trend of the effort ratios with network density remains the same for different simulation lengths.
All in all, from Equation 4, CTRL interval jamming has the highest lifetime advantage, followed by listen interval jamming, and lastly data packet jamming.
IV. COUNTERMEASURE
The most straightforward solution is probably to encrypt every packet, so that jammers cannot deduce the schedule as well as differentiate the type of packets. However if a single encryption key is used for every node, then we have a single-key vulnerability. If we have more than 1 key, each node will have to send a packet encrypted with different keys each time, resulting in drastically higher, energy usage. If we use just one schedule, no matter how many keys we use to encrypt the schedule, the attacker would know that schedule once it knows 1 key. If we use more than one schedule, and encrypt a different schedule with a different key, then some nodes would never learn about some schedules, resulting in some inevitable packet collisions. All in all, doing the encryption right is hard.
To counter data packet jamming which has the highest censorship rate, our proposal is to use what we call data blurting and schedule switching. The idea is that after n times timing out waiting for an ACK, the sender 'blurts' out its data packet without going through the RTS/CTS/datdACK sequence. Upon receiving the blurted packet, the receiver announces a switch of schedule in the next cycle. After some finite number of cycles, the receiver and its neighbors would synchronize with the new schedule, which is a right shift of the old schedule along the time axis, by the length of I listen interval and 1 CTRL interval. We let the receiver and not the blurter announce the schedule switch because letting the blurter do it would result in too many schedule switches, which in turn would cause a vast drop in throughput. The receiver might or might not receive the blurted data packet, but once it receives a blurted data packet, it knows for sure that a schedule switch is necessary.
Compare Table I and Table I1 to see how our technique alleviates the effect of data packet jamming, e.g. when Tsim = 1200s and D. = 7, the censorship rate is on average reduced from 99% to 52%. [17] . We think the attack is irrelevant in the case of S-MAC where nodes go to sleep periodically -it would be long before the energy of the sensor nodes is exhausted, and in contrast it would not be too long before the attacker exhausts its own energy first. Negi and Perrig [18] have investigated the attack of a jammer that detects and jams RTS packets, as well as sends RTS packets to reserve the largest time interval possible, using the Poisson arrival model. In reality, RTS packets are typically too short to react to in time, jamming the ensuing CTS or data packets is more feasible. The attacker also has to send RTS packets that can pass the integrity check by the normal sensor nodes. Our attackers are not bound by such an assumption.
Konorski [ 191 has proposed a scheduling policy that addresses the selfish behavior of using small or no contention windows in contention-based protocoh, in the context of single-hop networks. We are only interested in multi-hop networks. Kyasanur and Vaidya [20] targets selfishness in IEEE 802.1 1, specifically in the random backoff mechanism. cagalj et al. 1211 investigate the effect of a group of selfish cheaters from a gametheoretic viewpoint. We focus on DOS attacks, in which the purpose of the misbehaving party lies in disruption instead of getting more bandwidth. Different countermeasures are thus required.
VI. CONCLUSION
Among all attacks on network protocols of sensor networks, we argue that link-layer attacks are the most relevant, on the grounds of energy efficiency, and given the fact that the correct functioning of any higherlevel protocol depends on a working link layer. In this paper, we have demonstrated both qualitatively and quantitatively how listen interval jamming, CTRL interval jamming and data packet jamming affect S-MAC. Based on our results, we have shown that data packet jamming is better than the other attacks in censorship rate by a small margin. We have also shown that CTRL interval jamming has the best lifetime advantage. As a countermeasure to data packet jamming, we have proposed a new technique based on data blurting and schedule switching. We realize that we need a better approach to reduce the standard deviations of this technique, and also a countermeasure to the other attacks. At the same time, we also plan to report more attacks on S-MAC, particularly in how the attackers might analyze encrypted S-MAC traftic and respond to changes in the schedule, validation of our simulations in a later paper.
